Vikas Agarwal

(Georgia State University

J. Mack Robinson College of Business)

fncvaa@langate.gsu.edu

 

SEGUNDA-FEIRA, 31 DE MAIO DE 2004, ÀS 17:30 H

SALA DO CONSELHO

 

"Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge Funds"

 

em co-autoria com

Naveen Daniel (Georgia State University) 

e Narayan Naik (London Business School)

 

Vikas Agarwal 

PhD in Finance (London Business School)

Master of Management Studies (University of Bombay)

 

 

Assistant Professor of Finance 

Georgia State University  (2001-…)

 

Teaching Assistant for finance courses in the MBA, Masters in Finance, Executive MBA and Sloan Programs 

London Business School (1996-2001)

 

Publicações 

Review of Financial Studies, 2004

 Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2000 

Journal of Asset Management, 2000 

Journal of Alternative Investments, 2000

 

WPs 

"Gain-Loss versus Mean-Variance Analysis: Evidence from Portfolios of Hedge Funds and Passive Strategies" with Narayan Y. Naik

"Risk-Taking Incentives and Hedge Fund Volatility" with Naveen D. Daniel and Narayan Y. Naik

"Risks in Hedge Fund Strategies: Case of Convertible Arbitrage"with William H. Fung, Yee Cheng Loon, and Narayan Y.Naik

"A Clinical Study of the Determinants and Implications of Frauds in the Hedge Fund Industry" with Nicole Boyson, and Narayan Y. Naik

 

Research interests 

Asset Pricing and Investments - Portfolio Management, Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds, Performance Evaluation and Capital Markets

 

Abstract

Using a comprehensive database of individual hedge funds and funds of hedge funds, we investigate the determinants of money-flow and performance in the hedge fund industry. We have several important findings. First, good performers in a given year experience significantly larger money-flows in the subsequent year and this performance-flow relation is convex. Second, funds with persistently good (bad) performance attract larger (smaller) inflows compared to those that show no persistence. Third, we find that money-flows are positively associated with managerial incentives measured by the delta of the option-like incentive-fee contract offered to hedge fund managers. Fourth, when we examine the relation between flows and future performance, we find that larger hedge funds with greater inflows are associated with worse performance in the future, a result consistent with decreasing returns to scale in the hedge fund industry. Fifth, we find that funds with better managerial incentives (those with greater delta) are associated with better performance in the future. Finally, we find that unlike individual hedge funds, funds of hedge funds enjoy economies of scale. Overall, these results significantly improve our understanding of the complex interaction between money-flows, performance, and managerial incentives in the hedge fund industry.

 

PROMOVIDO POR: CEMPRE/CETE;

CONTACTO: Prof. Dr. Aurora Teixeira, ateixeira@fep.up.pt, tel. 225571242, fax 225505050.

Paper para o seminário