

# Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Telecommunication Industry

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**Abstract:** Recent terrorism act especially in the middle-east countries like the Palestine and the Afghanistan have infected African countries like Nigeria and brought domestic terrorism into the front burner. This study investigates boko haram insurgency activities in Nigeria: defining, addressing and understanding its impacts on the telecommunication industry. This study provides a descriptive exploration of the evolution of boko haram insurgency as one of the domestic terror group in Nigeria. The activities of this terrorist group have paralyzed the social- economic activities and done a lot of damages on the telecom hardware of the telecom service providers operating within the north east Nigeria. The study reveals that there will be no significant difference on the series of attacks carried out by BH insurgents and vandalization of telecom basic infrastructure of operators in the north east of Nigeria. However, domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected region in Nigeria tends towards the same direction with the first hypothesis. This paper concludes that the affected region is not likely to resist or have contrary opinions to heavy presence of Nigeria army and other security operatives under the Nigeria armed forces to secure their life and property.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram; Domestic terrorism; Vandalization; Telecommunication Industry.

**JEL Codes:** D74; K42; L96

## 1. Introduction

Boko haram and domestic terrorism recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization. Violent radicalization involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. Actually, the term “violent radicalization” originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It is not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialization leading to the use of violence. However, the term can be misleading because the socialization process itself does not have to be “violent”. From the above statement one can deduce that boko haram at the initial stage was not born to be violent. However, Nigeria security operatives trace its true historical root to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maidugiri, Borno State. It flourished as a non-violent movement until Mohammed Yusuf assumed leadership of the sect in 2002. Over time, after the death of Abubakar Lawan the group has metamorphosed and well promoted by our local media, writers and commentators under various names like the Nigerian Taliban, Muhajirun, Yusufiyah sect, and BH. The sect, however, prefers to be addressed as the Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, meaning a ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’. The truth is BH originated from the Northern part of Nigeria and the majority occupants are predominantly Muslims but that

does not make the entire locality a very fertile ground for religious activism as pointed out by Ajayi (2012).

Considering this statement you cannot be more Roman Catholic than the Pope. The northerners cannot be more Islamic than the Arabians meanwhile the Arabians still embrace western education with caution; they still send their sons to study outside their country precisely to the United States and they speak English language. Compare this to the press release on YouTube expressing ‘full support’ for the violent attacks, denying that Boko Haram fighters killed children. Wagging his finger, Shekau warned, ‘School teachers who are teaching Western education: We will kill them! We will kill them!’ In the video, received by the Associated Press through intermediaries. Shekau also denied he is negotiating a ceasefire with the Nigerian government, ‘We will not enter into any agreement with non-believers or the Nigerian government,’ he said. Speaking in his native Hausa language. Shekau added that ‘The Qur’an teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun Western education, and we must shun the constitution.’ At the end he speaks in English to denounce the West, accusing it of trying to destroy Islam and working ‘to tactically make the Qur’an insignificant and unimportant’ (Elombah, 2013).

BH become a terrorist group since the group lose focus after the death of the founder of Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maidugiri, Borno State. It is important to note that there is no universally agreed definition of terrorism but their activities can easily be recognized and felt. Their

activities involve bombings, hijackings, kidnappings and other unimaginable violence act in order to intimidate nations, societies, groups and states into changing their policies. The act of becoming terrorist began when Mohammed Yusuf assumed the of headship of the group. He was finally captured and later killed by the police. Following the death of Yusuf and the mass killings and arrest of many of their members, the group retreated and re-strategized in various ways under the umbrella of Abubakar Shekau, alias 'Darul Tawheed'.

Immediately after the death of the founder (Abubakar Lawan), the group change completely from being non violent to becoming violent and even constitute terror to their immediate environment such as considering western influence on Islamic society, particularly western education, as the basis of the religion's weakness which invariably leads to radicalism. As an ideology, radicalism challenges the legitimacy of established norms and policies but it does not, in itself, lead to violence. There have been many radical groups in European political history which were reformist rather than revolutionary. In other words, there can be radicalism without the advocacy of violence to strive for the realization of social or political change. When it comes to "religious radicalism" within strands of contemporary political Islam or Islamism, as ideology and movement, one can for instance, find Salafist groups which are non-violent. Some of these groups are even reluctant to become involved in politics. Religious radicalism uses various strategies that may include political and reformist actions, cultural struggle and the strengthening of the community of believers through missionary work (Alonso, Bjorgo, Porta, Coolseat, Khosrokhavar, Lohlker, Ranstorp, Reinare, Schmid, Silke, Taarnby, De Vries, 2006).

Terrorism has existed for at least two thousand (2,000) years and is likely to remain a fixture on political agendas, both domestic and international, for years to come. Historically, the first known acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetrated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a Jewish sect active in Judea during the 1st century AD. When the Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule of what is today Israel through a determined campaign primarily involving assassination. History recorded that Zealot fighters used the sica, a primitive dagger, to attack their enemies in broad daylight, often in crowded market places or on feast days—essentially wherever there were people to witness the violence. In short, the Jewish zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many Roman soldiers and destroying Roman property (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012). In 1794, the term "terrorisme" came into existence during the French revolution to refer to a policy of more or less arbitrary victimization of alleged and real political opponents, the understanding of what constitutes "terrorism" has been changing. In furtherance, the word (terrorism) did not became attractive until the early 20th century when it was adopted by a group of Russian revolutionaries during the Soviet Revolution in 1917 to describe their violent struggle against tsarist rule. Thus, Lenin and Stalin,

evolved government sponsored terrorism as a useful tool to maintain government control. These two important personalities systematically used the act of terrorism to intimidate and frighten the entire society. According to them, both terror and fear were veritable instruments for governmental operations (Danjibo, 2009).

During the early 1920s, terrorism became associated more with the tyrannical practices used by dictatorial states than with the violence of non-state groups like the anarchists. The word "terrorism" was used to describe the meaningless violence and intimidation inflicted by the Nazi, fascist, and totalitarian regimes that respectively came to power in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The repressive means these governments employed against their citizens involved beatings, unlawful detentions, torture, so-called death squads (often consisting of off-duty or plain-clothes security or police officers), and other forms of intimidation. Nigeria also witnessed this under the military administration of Gen. Babangida and Gen. Sani Abacha, big thanks to democracy and rule of laws Chief Obasanjo would have been worst. Such practices by governments against their own citizens continue today. Recent history records the use of such measures by the military dictatorships that took power in Argentina, Chile, and Greece during the 1970s. But these state-sanctioned acts of violence are more generally termed "terror" to distinguish them from violence committed by non-state entities. Terrorism particularly in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and up till the 1990s have taken different trends and dimensions. Abimbola and Adesote (2012) identified this trend to be in three dimensions: First, loosely organized, self-financed and internationalized network of terrorists, Secondly, terrorism, which is religiously or ideologically-motivated. For instance, radical BH group, or groups use religion as platform to pose terrorist threats of various kinds to many nations' interests (Ojukwu, 2011). The third trend in terrorism is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations which may involve combinations of military training or funding, technology transfer or political advice. In fact, threatening over the entire issue of international terrorism is a trend toward proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For instance, Republic of Iran, seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, has been aggressively seeking a nuclear arms capability. Also, there are unconfirmed indications that the Al Qaeda organization attempted to acquire chemical, biological, and radiological and nuclear weapons before the death of Osama Bin Laden (Bagaji A.S.Y et al, 2011).

The BH group fall under the second trend of the three dimensions identified by Abimbola and Adesote (2012). The radical group redefined their tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run tactics and adding new flexible violent tactics, such as the placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), targeted assassination, drive-by shooting and suicide bombings (Onuoha, 2012). BH had traditionally focused on the security establishment and personnel, community and religious leaders, politicians, centres of worship and other civilian targets. Just of recent, it has added

markets, public schools, hospitals, tertiary institutions, media houses, live stocks and more recently, basic infrastructure such as telecommunication facilities are vandalized. The impact of these group activities has earned them international recognition which attracted local and international media.

It is important to note, that only few studies seem to have been conducted in this part of the world with special reference to domestic terrorism on the states of Nigeria economy. For example the studies of Abimbola and Adesote (2012), Ajayi (2012), Danjibo (2009) did not directly address this issue. It is on this note, this study set out to investigate the impact of BH insurgency on the state of Nigeria economy using the telecom industry as a case study. The choice of this sample is partly based on the assumption of the importance of the telecom industry which is to provide efficient communication network for Nigerians by connecting the country to rest of the world. With respect to not only providing efficient communication services but also project the national economy to the rest of the world in the area of globalization through information and technology, this is sufficiently capable of influencing the national economic growth. With this in mind, this study is designed to address the following research question and hypotheses respectively: How does the series of attacks carried out by BH insurgency on the telecom service providers affect the state of Nigeria economy? Emanating from this research question are the following hypotheses to be tested:

Ho1 There will be no significant correlation between the series of attacks carried out by BH insurgency and vandalization of telecom basic infrastructure of operators in the north east of Nigeria.

Ho2 There will be no significant correlation between domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected region in the Nigerian state.

## **2. Boko Haram (BH) and Domestic Terrorism (DT) in Nigeria**

There is no general agreement among scholars, researchers and even writers as to the concept of terrorism. It has been viewed that terrorism is value overloaded and subjectively defined in line with the ideological school of the individual defining it. Thus, terrorism both as practiced and justified by terrorist themselves, is a tool used to achieve a specific outcome by using force or violence on one segment of society with the primary goal of causing fear in the larger society to make change in that society (Garrison, 2004). In short, terrorism is a term used to describe violence or other harmful acts such as kidnapping, armed robbery, assassinations, pipe - line vandalization and a host of others. These happen to be some of the challenges confronting the federal government of Nigeria. Despite the measures put in place to suppressing terrorism, the danger seems to be over stressing the government and the citizens of Nigeria. The fact is that most of the government efforts have been mere window dressing as they have not actually addressed the issues that brought

about terrorism in those areas. For example, while government actions in the Niger Delta were merely settling the militants and their leaders, the general lack of infrastructural development in the Zone has remained unsolved.

Domestic and BH terrorism constitute the highest form of insecurity in this nation. However, the concept - security, is empty without a critical discourse of something pertinent to secure. Indeed, security could best be understood when situated within the context of a referent object (Nwagboso, 2012). In the history of humans, the central focus of security has been people (Rothschild, 1995). Contrarily, some scholars especially those in international politics have argued that when thinking about security, states should be the most important referents. On the other hand, some analysts have challenged this position by arguing that any intellectual discourse on security should accord priority to human beings since without reference to individual humans, security makes no sense (McSweeney, 1999).

Notwithstanding these controversial debates, the focus of this aspect of investigation is on BH and other domestic terrorism and their impact on the telecom industry. However, domestic and BH terrorism has been a major cankerworm in Nigeria basket which pose a threat to security of life and property and Nigeria is presently mired in a state of obfuscation. To be precise, Nigeria has long been facing severe security challenges from terrorists prior to 1999. Thus, there has been a great internal insecurity challenges in Nigeria before the dawn of democracy in 1999. For instance, Maitatsine activities in the 1980s, the Odua'a People's Congress (OPC) in the South West and the Bakasi boys in the South East.

## **3. Boko Haram (BH) and telecom: Impacts on the Nigeria economy**

Telecom industry in Nigeria has witnessed sporadic changes since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999, and the contributions of this sector to national growth has been enormous. Just of recent the Executive Vice Chairman, NCC, Dr. Eugene Juwah, disclosed that the expansion of telecom facilities in the country has increased the inflow of foreign direct investment, FDI from \$18bn in 2009 to \$25bn (N3.9trillion). In 2009, the industry's FDI stood at \$18bn but grew significantly to reach N3.9 trillion, about \$25bn. The \$7bn FDI increase represents about 39 per cent growth in the total investment inflows into the country telecoms sector (Olaleye, 2012). However, this sector had been under threat with the recent bombing of over thirty telecoms infrastructure in the Northeastern (Yobe, Gombe, Kano, Borno and Potiskum) part of the country and Boko haram terrorists claim responsibility. For instance, BH launched a two day synchronized attack on telecom masts belonging to several telecom operators across the above mentioned five cities in northern Nigeria. Furthermore, BH has mounted several attacks, mostly targeting base stations. Attacks on telecom facilities add a new dimension to the pre-existing security challenges,

as entire base stations are destroyed with IEDs, suicide bombers and other incendiary devices (Onuoha 2013).

In 2012, some 530 base stations were damaged and vandalized in Nigeria. While 380 were destroyed by floods that affected many communities in many states of the federation, 150 were damaged in northern Nigeria by BH. Okonji (2013) notes, that BH like their Taliban counterparts in Afghanistan, their strategic objective is to attack telecom infrastructure in order to choke one of the supply lines of intelligence to Nigeria's intelligence and security system. However, when terrorists or insurgents successfully attack critical telecommunication infrastructure, it generates costs that could be assessed from different angles depending on the nature and how critical of such a facility is to the economy and security. Onuoha 2013 identified that BH attacks on base stations have generated at least three dimensions of 'costs', namely:

- Casualty Cost: that is cost incurred on the loss of life and properties, expenses on those who are critically injured as a result of terrorist attacks.
- Service Cost: the aftermaths of their series of attacks lead to network outages and poor service delivery.
- Financial Cost: the network operators that are seriously affected will spend money initially earmarked for network expansion and optimizing existing infrastructure on replacing the vandalized facilities. Telecom operators in Nigeria have lost about N75bn (naira) to damage and vandalization caused by BH and flood in 2012. Telecoms infrastructure analysts have put the average cost of a base station in Nigeria at \$250,000 (N 39.47 million), and it will cost some N15.9 billion to replace the damaged base stations. The affected operators are MTN Nigeria, Etisalat, Airtel, Globacom, Multi-Links, Helios Towers, IHS and other ISPs.

It must be noted that the heavy presence of terrorism act has greatly created a lot of setback for local and Foreign Direct Investment inflows into the nation's telecommunication sector and unprecedented in the history of telecoms sector in Nigeria.

On the other hand the socio economic break - down as a result of BH insurgency led to the declaration of state of emergency in the three states of the northern part notably Yobe, Borno and Adamawa as part of continued efforts to address the nation's growing insecurity. This declaration impacted negatively but relatively small on the Nigeria's GDP growth. The agriculture sector was badly affected and it led to a significant increase in food prices. However, these three states are some of the county's poorest with the states also having the least educated and high rates of unemployment. They account for 6 per cent of Nigeria's GDP, with agricultural activities dominating half of their collective workforce in the three states. And by implication, 50 per cent of these states GDP stems from agriculture. Particularly, Borno State is the country's third biggest employer of agricultural workers (5 per cent). The three states collectively employ 10 per cent of the country's agricultural workforce.

In terms of population – the three states are home to 7 per cent of the country's population. Yobe State's per capita income of \$1,206 (N190, 000) is one of the five lowest in Nigeria, by the bank's estimates. Adamawa is not far off at \$1,233 (N194, 000). Borno State's per capita income is relatively higher, at \$1,631 (N257, 000), which is equivalent to the national average, \$1,700 (N267, 000). Also 25-30 per cent of the working age population in the three states is unemployed, compared to a national average of 21 per cent in 2010. Less than 11 per cent of the population in the three states have completed primary school, compared to over 65 per cent in Lagos State. These states also have a less than 11 per cent secondary school attendance rate, compared to an over 75 per cent attendance rate in Nigeria's south-east states. Improve security situation of the three states would translate positively on their economy. The overall impact on the market implications will depend more on the success of the operation and implications for the security situation not just in the three states. Never mind the fact; the regions affected are not significant in terms of the overall economy. The three affected states account for seven per cent of Nigeria's population, but just six per cent of the country's GDP. Urgent measure needs to be taken to rescue innocent populace, who are mostly peasant farmers, women and children from the hands of this terror group.

#### 4. Research Methods

##### Research Instrument

Since the study was descriptive in nature, the questionnaire was adopted as the best instrument for collecting data. This was because the subjects of the study were telecom employees under the senior management which are technical officer, customer service officer, operation officer, senior manager and heads of operation. It also saved time which is limited, since it was easy to administer to a large population and to score. In addition to this, it simplified the task of categorizing, tabulating and summarizing responses.

The questionnaire consisted of five sections. All questions from Section 2 to Section 5 applied scaled questions which used a 5-point Likert scale to allow quantifiable analysis ranging from Strongly Agree (SA) = 5, Agree (A) = 4, Indifferent (I) = 3, Disagree (2) and Strongly Disagree (1). Another five scale likert scale questionnaire ranging from Very Important (VI) = 5, Important (I) = 4, Undecided (U) = 3, Not Important (NI) = 2, and Not At All (NAAI) = 1 was used as well to obtain respondents view on the subject matter of BH series attack of the telecom industry.

##### Sample and Sampling Procedure

The sample of this study is comprised of 200 employees randomly drawn from two telecomm services providers i.e MTN and Glo.

## Procedure and Instruments

Participants completed a 25 item 5 point likert scale questionnaire designed and validated by the researcher. The two hypotheses generated were tested at .05 alpha level.

## 5. Results

This aspect of the study presents the analysis of the data collected for the study. The raw scores obtained from the questionnaire administered were aggregated for each of the different section (variables) in the study for the test of hypotheses. The breakdown of the respondent's demographic characteristics is shown in Table 1. Most of respondents were male (61.5%) with most in the age brackets 35-44 years (43.5%), are working as senior staff (52.7%) and have been working with the telecoms company for 5-10 years (50%). Table 1 also shows that 74.2% are First degree holders (are graduate from

recognized university like University of Lagos, Lagos State University, Obafemi Awolowo University, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University etc most of the participants schooled between 1997-2001 ) while postgraduate degree holders (such as Masters in Business Administration, M.Sc Management, M.Sc Information Technology from recognized University home and overseas) constitute 25.8%. Since the respondents were First Degree and postgraduate degree holders, the telecom firms under study have enough qualified staff who can best achieve the organizations' objectives. However, it may mean more money to be expended as salary. As shown in Table 1, respondents cluster in annual income. 32.7% of respondents receive less than NIM (5000USD). Majority (63.9%) of the respondents were in category of NIM-N5M (5000USD - 25000USD) while the respondents that receive N6M-N10 (30000USD - 50000USD) were 3.4%.

**Table 1: Respondents' Data**

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percent
<b>1</b>	<b>Sex</b>		
	Male	109	58.6
	Female	77	41.4
<b>2</b>	<b>Age</b>		
	16-24	22	11.8
	25-34	67	36
	35-44	71	38.2
	45-55	19	10.2
	Over 55 years	7	3.8
<b>3</b>	<b>Work Experience</b>		
	Senior Staff	98	52.7
	Manager	53	28.5
	Senior Manager	23	12.4
	Executive Manager	12	6.4
<b>4</b>	<b>Work years of experience</b>		
	Less than 5 years	48	25.8
	5-10 years	93	50
	11-15 years	23	12.4
	16-20 years	13	6.9
	Over 20 years	9	4.9
<b>5</b>	<b>Level of Education</b>		-
	Secondary (Six years maximum)	-	-
	Tertiary (Between four and five years)	138	82.1
	Post-graduate (Minimum of eighteen months)	48	17.9
	<b>Income level</b>		
	Less than NIM (5000USD)	61	32.7
	NIM-N5M (5000USD-25000USD)	119	63.9
	N6M-N10(30000USD- 50000USD)	6	3.4
	N11M-N15m (55000USD – 75000USD )	-	-
	N15M and above (75000USD – and above)	-	-

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Table 2.0 shows the reliability score for the measurement scale. Any research variables that exceeded the acceptable standard of reliability analysis of 0.70 will be accepted. The Cronbach's Alpha reliability scores of BH series of attack, Telecom industry and other domestic terrorist group, economic pressure, and political pressure are 0.92, 0.875, 0.891 and 0.869 respectively. All the scales are above the generally accepted reliability level of 0.70. The acceptable range should be at least 0.70, with high coefficient the better (Coakes et al., 2009).

**Table 2: The results of reliability analysis for measurement scale**

Variables	Total number of item	Cronbach's Alpha
BH series of attack	20	0.921
Telecom industry	16	0.875
Economic pressure	10	0.891
Political Pressure	11	0.869

**Source:** Field Survey, 2014

## 6. Analyses and Discussion

**Hypothesis 1** - There is no significant correlation in the series of attack carried out by BH and vandalization of telecom basic infrastructures.

To test this hypothesis, data was collected on BH and telecom basic infrastructure. On Table 3, the Pearson chi-square correlation statistic was tested.

Results showed that BH series of attack was positively and significantly related to efficient communication delivery in the north eastern part of Nigeria (Pearson Chi-Square = 112.060,  $p < 0.05$ ). The computed value of pearson chi-square of 70.38, is higher than its chi-square critical value of 35.17 at 95% confidence level. Since the computed value of pearson chi-square is higher than its chi-square critical value, the study rejects the null

hypothesis. This implies that telecoms operators that are physically present in the north eastern part of Nigeria still perform better than other operators that are not physically present. Finding further showed the mean value (7.998) of telecom operators analysis that are physically present in the northeastern part of the country in overcoming political and economic pressure which is greater than the mean value (4.874) of telecom provider that do not have physical presence as at the time of conducting this study. This illustrates a significant difference between the performance of telecoms companies that are present in the north east and that have most of their infrastructure destroyed still perform better than those that are not physically present there.

**Table 3: Pearson chi-square correlation between activities of BH insurgency and vandalization of tececom basic infrastructures in the telecom industry**

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	112.060 <sup>a</sup>	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	145.142	12	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	75.341	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	186		

a. 11 cells (52.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

**Source:** Field Survey, 2014

**Table 4: Domestic Terrorism and Economic growth**

Variables	No	Mean	Standard Deviation	df	Calculated t	Critical t-value	Decision
National economy	186	72.53	46.8	185	13.56	0.349	H2 rejected
Domestic terrorism	186	66.51	40.3	185			

**Source:** Field Survey, 2014

**Hypothesis 2** - There is no significant correlation between domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected region in the Nigerian state.

To test this hypothesis, data collected on domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected

region in the Nigerian state were aggregated and subjected to Independent t-test analysis. Table 4 shows significance correlation between domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected region in the Nigerian state. The above indicates that the calculated t-

value of 13.56 is greater than the critical t-value of 0.349 at the degree of freedom of 185 and tested at 0.05 significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis which stated that there will be no significant correlation between domestic terrorism and the economic growth of the affected region in the Nigerian state is rejected. The implication of this finding is that a significant correlation exists between domestic terrorism and national economy.

## Discussion

The findings of this study provide some context for considering the activities of domestic terrorism and the recent upsurge of BH extremist activities in the north east of the country and the economic importance of the telecom industry in Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines BH insurgency in Nigeria: defining, addressing and understanding its impact on the telecom industry. Overall, the participants demonstrated different levels of addressing the main issue. However, of specific importance to this study were findings that employees of the telecom services providers did not show any significant difference in their understanding and addressing the impact of BH on the telecom industry. This finding corroborates Alao, Atere & Alao (2012) that the current high level of insecurity in Nigeria is not insurmountable given an objective analysis of the causative factors and adoption of correct institutional mechanisms to address the multi-dimensional issues involved. Such issues apart from those reflected in Mohammed (2011) above include the inability to mobilize the masses to support government measures in order to curb the insurgence as every fact point in the direction that the sect enjoys the support of high and low disgruntled elements particularly in the north. The unsolicited support was easily given to the sect because of the manner the insurgence was approached like declaration of war that equally leave members of the public to suffer from the sect as well as the military that ought to protect them.

Hypothesis two predicted that there is no significant correlation between domestic terrorism and economic growth of the affected region was not confirmed. Studies over the last decade have established that internal conflicts can have significant economic consequences in terms of reduced growth within a conflict-ridden country (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2003; Collier and Sambanis, 2002) and in neighboring

countries (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, 2004). For instance a small economy in which terrorism is prevalent and affects daily activities as in Colombia, Israel, and the Basque region of Spain and Nigeria. For these economies, terrorism can reduce GDP and hinder development, especially during prolonged campaigns (e.g., Israel since September 27, 2000). Protracted terrorism leads to the anticipation of future events, which create risk premiums that limit activities in terrorism-prone sectors. Investors, both at home and abroad, may decide to direct their assets to safer activities in other countries. If terrorists succeed in scaring away investments, they may be emboldened to take further actions to cause more grievous economic losses.

## 7. Conclusion

As long as violence and terrorist act persists from dissenter groups called by any name, such as OPC, MEND, Bakasi boys and BH, it is clear that the federal government has failed in all approaches to solving insecurity problem in the country. Given that a large number of people including women and children are at high risk of being attacked and being taken as hostages by this domestic terrorist groups and literatures reveals that the military and political approaches adopted at improving security arising from the Niger Delta militancy, Oodua People's Congress, Bakasi boys and BH have failed to stem the deluge of pipeline and telecom hard ware vandalization, illegal refineries, kidnapping, crude oil theft and bunkering. Despite all the sophisticated military hardware provided for the police and other security agents, the BH particularly persist to hit hard core targets in and around the North eastern part of the country. The affected region is not likely to resist or have contrary opinions to heavy presence of Nigeria army to save life and property. On this note, the following recommendations are made. In the first place BH is one of several profound threats to Nigeria's stability and it constitutes a major cankerworm to security because of it dissatisfaction with bad governance, official impunity and corruption. To address this dispute, the federal and state governments, as well as the community leaders, must develop and implement comprehensive plans to tackle physical security and also investigate the grievances that fuel insurgency. On the other hand, radical reform of governance and the country's political culture is necessary.

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